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Preliminary Obiection 
In her Brief, Belinda references facts not a part of the record of this appeal, on the basis 
that she apparently intends to file a motion to augment the record. Ryan objects to any such 
motion, and to any such augmentation. The Notice of the Record was sent out by the Clerk of 
the Court on March 16,2010, and the 28 days in which to file an objection to the record, or to 
request additions or deletions from the record, is long-since passed. 
Admittedly, under I.A.R. Rules 30, 32, and 34, Belinda has the right to file a motion to 
augment the record with authority or argument. However, as Ryan understands it, Belinda's 
intended motion is to augment the record with an affidavit from a witness whom Ryan never had 
the opportunity to cross-examine, and whose allegations are not relevant to the issues before this 
Court on this appeal. To wait until after Ryan has had to file briefs, and then ask to 
augment the record with additional "facts" which Ryan will not have the opportunity to respond 
to without additional briefing and the consequent expense, unnecessarily increases the costs of 
this litigation. Accordingly, Ryan hereby objects both to a) the references made by Belinda in 
her Brief to matters which are not part of this record, and b) to any motion hereafter filed to 
augment the settled record with either of the documents referred to by Belinda in her Brief 
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Appellant's Rebuttal to Respondent's Brief. 
Respondent's (hereinafter "Belinda") Reply Brief is quite short, and in most respects, 
fails to address the arguments made in Appellant's (hereinafter "Ryan") Brief on this Appeal. 
These omissions are fairly obvious, however, Ryan will point out these omissions, and rebut the 
arguments made by Belinda accordingly. Further, there are a couple of what appear to Ryan to 
be either misrepresentations or obfuscations, which Ryan will also address. Since, in doing so, 
Ryan believes that he has responded fully to Belinda's argument, the organization of this Brief is 
simple. Ryan would argue that there are other omissions and/or misrepresentations made by 
Belinda, but which do not warrant further expense to rebut. Accordingly, Ryan presents the 
following rebuttal to Belinda's Brief. 
1. The Ad Hominem Attacks on Ryan's Character. 
The animosity apparent in Belinda's briefing belies the true nature of these appellate 
proceedings. Throughout, Belinda, through her counsel, has attempted to paint a picture of Ryan 
as "an ogre," as engaged in "obsessive efforts to keep the child away from his mother," that he 
"opposed normal contact for the children with their mother at every turn - at the hospital and 
even while Isaiah was in hospice care . . ." These inflammatory and hostile comments reference 
"facts" outside of the record, and present a jaundiced view of the one parent the parties' children 
have been able to rely on, for support, for care, and for affection and love, since the time of the 
parties' divorce. 
Perhaps the most offensive of these personal attacks is the last referenced, supra. In it's 
entirety the statement reads: 
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"As if the ultimately terminal condition of Isaiah was not enough to deal with, 
Ryan opposed normal contact for the children with their mother at every turn - at 
the hospital and even while Isaiah was in hospice care shortly before his death in 
the early morning hours of July 2,2008." Belinda's Brief, at p. 4. 
The obvious connotation of this statement is that Ryan was some combination of mean, 
cruel, selfish and without regard for Belinda's heartbreaking struggle to come to terms with 
Isaiah's "ultimately terminal condition." The irony, of course, is that Belinda seems to have no 
sympathy whatsoever for, and infers the worst intentions of, Ryan, when in fact, as the parent 
who had been the primary caregiver for Isaiah for the 5 years between the date of the divorce and 
the time he came down with his illness, it should be readily apparent to anyone that Ryan was, if 
possible, the more deeply affected parent. 
Further, this Court should place these comments in the context of some of the other 
assertions made by Belinda, which are demonstrably misrepresentative. For example, Belinda 
makes it appear as though the trial court regarded or implied that Ryan was "an incredible ogre." 
In a footnote on page 5, she states: "The court did infer that a parent, such as Ryan Rodriguez, 
would be "an incredible ogre" to refuse to allow a sick child to be comforted by both parents." 
Belinda's Brief, pg. 5, footnote 4.   he conclusion stated by Belinda is clearly stated, "that a 
parent, such as R ~ a n  Rodriguez," and clearly implies that the trial court regarded Ryan as "an 
incredible ogre." However, if one actually consults the transcript, one finds that the trial court 
reached exactly the opposite conclusion. 
[The Court]: Having said that, there is no question in my mind whatsoever that 
when a child is in the hospital, unless the parent involved is just an incredible 
ogre, that the child needs to see both parents and the child needs to be able to be 
comforted by both parents. I don't think there's any question about that. Mr. Cox 
in his argument indicates that Mr. Rodriguez acknowledges that, that in fact the 
child needs as much nurturing support as he can possibly get in order to insure 
that he is cared for and that he has the best opportunity to heal and get back on his 
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feet. 
Ouite frankly, in this case, the modification proposed by Mr. Rodriguez 
appears to be appropriate. It contemplated while the child was in the hospital 
daily contact between the child and his mother for at least an hour a day. two 
hours on Friday, eiaht hours on Saturday. And, again, it would be a continual 
rotation. So we would be talking about significant contact between Isaiah and his 
mother while he is in the hospital. - Tr. p. 24,ll. 18 to p. 25,ll. 14. Emphasis 
Added. 
This conclusion by the trial court directly contradicts Belinda's statement regarding the 
trial court's view of Ryan. Further, it directly contradicts other statements that she makes 
regarding Ryan, including: 
"The present case has its origins in Belinda's efforts to see her son before his death, and 
Ryan's obsessive efforts to keep the child away from his mother." 
Ryan's riposte is simply to observe that he proposed a schedule which allowed daily 
contact between Isaiah and Belinda, as noted by the trial court, and which proposal was 
incorporated into the temporarv order. 
The trial court's finding also refutes Belinda's assertion that: 
"As if the ultimately terminal condition of Isaiah was not enough to deal with, Ryan 
opposed normal contact for the children with their mother at every turn - at the hospital and even 
while Isaiah was in hospice care shortly before his death in the early morning hours of July 2, 
2008." Yes, Ryan certainly opposed "normal contact" by proposing contact on a daily basis. 
Belinda's patently false statements underscore the level of her hostility towards Ryan. 
Further, these false accusations demonstrate the potential for conflict between the parties, a 
potential which Ryan sought to keep Isaiah from experiencing while he was in the hospital, 
fighting for his life. Ryan proposed a schedule which would allow daily contact between Belinda 
and Isaiah, only to be met with the unreasonable and legally unfounded demand that the hospital 
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staff be given the right to make visitation decisions regarding Isaiah. 
2. The Parties' Positions Before the Trial Court. 
To be clear, counsel for Belinda argued, at the time of the hearing before Judge Hansen, 
that unnamed third parties be given what amounted to custody of Isaiah. 
[Mr. Bauer]: What we're asking the Court to do, Judge, is very simply declare 
that under joint custody each of these parents has access to the child at a medical 
facility according to what the medical facility and the medical providers determine 
and say is appropriate. They are perfectly able to determine - and they do it every 
day, to determine what is appropriate for their patients and this is something that 
they can do. - Tr. p. 11,ll. 6-1 5. 
It just does not seem right that a parent who has joint custody can't attend their 
child at a hospital if the medical facilitv deems it appropriate. If the medical 
facility and the treatment providers consider her presence there appropriate, then 
that should be the determiner. - Tr. pp. 21-22,ll. 23-3. 
Belinda's counsel also went to great pains to make it clear that Belinda was asking the 
trial court to modifl the supervision requirement existing under the 200 1 Order. 
[Mr. Bauer]: I don't think we're asking for a modification of the actual access 
terms of the order, the terms of when my client is entitled to have the children 
with her on her terms. This is not what she is seeking. But if the Court feels it is 
a modification request, perhaps it is. We're modifying in that sense to simply 
specifically declare that access by either parent should be determined by the 
medical providers and not be either parent. Tr. p. 12,ll. 3-12. 
She's not seeking visitation to expand her access to this child to her home or to 
some other place where she exercises exclusive care, albeit under supervision as 
provided in this order. That's not what she's seeking. She's seeking to attend the 
child while the child is in the custody and care of a medical facility. - Tr. p. 22, 
11. 4-1 1. 
These statements make it clear that Belinda was taking the position that unnamed, 
unknown "medical personnel" be given the right to determine what visitation was appropriate, 
when and for how long, and under what circumstances, and who would be allowed to be present. 
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Ryan believed then, and continues to believe now, that placing such authority over the parties' 
child in the hands of more or less total strangers was most definitely not in Isaiah's best interests, 
and appropriately refused to agree to such an abdication of his parental role. 
Further, Ryan's reasoning was made explicitly clear to the trial court. 
[Mr. Cox]: The issues that we have unfortunately because of the situation the way 
it is, there's a lot of animosity between Mr. Rodriguez and Mrs. Rodriguez, the 
defendant, and other members of the people that are in this child's unit that - - 
assuming that mother can come to the hospital any time she wants and be there at 
any time she wants, there's the potential for conflict in relation to other people 
that might be coming to visit the child during that time. And that's part of Mr. 
Rodriguez's basis of having these specific times. 
And again, a lot of what -- and I think that is spoken in the affidavit that was 
initially filed by Mr. Rodriguez in relation to the first motion that dealt with -part 
of the reasons why the supervised visits came about initially is because Mrs. 
Rodriguez wasn't exercising her visitations even though she was telling the kids 
that she was going to. 
There's a concern for that again now and as the child goes through his treatment. 
. . . -- Tr. p. 18,ll. 4-25. 
And, as you can see in Mr. Rodriguez's affidavit he full heartedly wants her to 
visit with the child on a regular scheduled basis so the child can anticipate it and 
then reward her for what she has not done in the past, which is follow through 
with the times. The affidavit sets forth for each week that she's able to make 
these times and be on time, well, increase it for half an hour visits which could 
result in hopefully the child not being in the hospital for a long period of time and 
it getting to be a big number, but it could result in long periods of time. 
But, again, it gets us to the point where there's a pattern set to where in the past, 
again set forth in his affidavit in the initial motion - or response to the motion, 
that that was the reason why there were problems and we didn't want to set the 
child up for mother not following through. - Tr. pp. 19-20,ll. 10-3. 
Far from being "an incredible ogre," Ryan proposed a daily visitation schedule, which 
would allow Belinda to have increasing amounts of time with Isaiah, so long as she exercised her 
visitation with him consistently, and in a timely fashion. Given that she had not exercised her 
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time with the children in the past, made misrepresentations as to when and even if she was going 
to spend time with them, it seems a reasonable position to take that Isaiah did not need the 
additional stress of worrying about potential conflict between his mother and other visitors, or the 
stress of worrying that she would not be there for him as she had not been in the past. Ryan's 
actions and proposed visitation were eminently reasonable, and were made with Isaiah's best 
interests in mind. Belinda's position and actions demonstrate not that she was concerned about 
Isaiah or the stress he was under, but rather her own desire for control, her hostility towards 
Ryan, and her fundamental unwillingness to either work with him or assume responsibility for 
her own prior actions. 
Thus, to the extent that the personal character of the parties' is relevant to this appeal, the 
record demonstrates that the trial court placed its' faith in Ryan's character, accepted his 
proposals, and concluded that he was acting in Isaiah's best interests. Conversely, the record 
demonstrates that Belinda has taken positions unreasonable and unwarranted under the law from 
the very beginning of this litigation, and has consistently mis-represented the findings and 
conclusions of the trial court, as well as the case law relevant to these proceedings. 
3. Belinda's Analysis of Nab is Inapposite. 
In her Brief, Belinda argues that "The Nab decision does not make contempt an absolute 
bar to modification." Brief, p. 6. Ryan agrees. In fact, Ryan spent a good deal of his initial brief 
on this appeal demonstrating that Nab provides a narrow exception to the rule that a child 
support conternnor may not seek to modifjr child support until s h e  has purged the contempt. As 
Ryan pointed out, the Nab exception has essentially been incorporated into I.R.C.P. 75, which 
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allows the affirmative defense of the present inability to comply with the order to be raised. 
Therefore, Belinda's analysis of Nab provides no real insight into the issues in this case. 
On a side note, the author will state that, in my experience, the Magistrate Judges of the 
4" District, Ada County, will frequently use Nab as a "short hand" or abbreviated way of 
referring to the line of cases of which Nab is only a part, namely those same cases referred to in 
Ryan's first Brief on this appeal, Vollmer v. Vollmer, 43 Idaho 395 (1 927)' 253 Pac. 622; Bedke 
v. Bedke, 57 Idaho 443,65 P.2d 1029 (1937), Sauvageau v. Sauvageau, 59 Idaho 190,81 P.2d 
73 1 (1 938), Hoagland v. Hoagland, 67 Idaho 67, 170 P.2d 609 (1946); Brown v. Brown, 66 
Idaho 625, 165 P.2d 886 (1946), and Lusty v. Lusty, 70 Idaho 382,219 P.2d 280 (1950), all of 
which dealt with some aspect of the nexus between a support contemnor's ability to bring a 
motion to modifl either support, custody, or both, and the policy of the Courts in responding to 
such a motion. 
4. Belinda's Analyses of Brown and Hoaaland are Superficial. 
Belinda's analysis of Brown, supra, does not even get the true ruling of the Idaho 
Supreme Court correct. Belinda asserts that the Idaho Supreme Court "was clearly not intending 
to bar consideration of a child's best interests in custody issues, since the modification of custody 
was affirmed by the Brown court." Belinda's Brief, p. 9. Ryan would disagree that the Court's 
decision "clearly" did not intend for child support contempt to stand as a defense to a motion to 
modify. In point of fact, the Brown Court, as Ryan previously demonstrated, the Supreme Court 
reversed the custody award of the two younger children, and only affirmed the decision to award 
custody of the oldest chil ) to the father based upon the condition that 
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the father purge himself of the contempt; "Court's action in granting custody of to 
appellant on condition that he purge himself of contempt was proper." Id at 627. 
Further, Belinda's "analysis" of Hoa~land, supra, invites this Court to assume that the 
Idaho Supreme Court of 1946 was incapable of understanding its' own decisions, or of making 
decisions which were consistent with one another. 
Belinda argues that the Hoagland Court's holding (that a trial court does not have the 
authority to take up custody issues where one of the parties is in contempt for failure to pay child 
support until the contemnor purges himself) is one that "appears therefore to have arisen 
essentially from nowhere and it appears to have disappeared just as quickly." Belinda's Brief, p. 
10. Obviously, if the trial courts of this state are applying the rule of Hoagland on a routine 
basis, it has not "disappeared." Nor, as Belinda implicitly acknowledges, did it arise from 
nowhere. 
As Ryan pointed out, and as Belinda acknowledges, the Brown decision quotes fiom 
Sauvaaeau v. Sauvageau, 59 Idaho 190,81 P.2d 73 1 (1938)' a case which was decided some 
eight years before both Brown and Hoagland. This is from Ryan's analysis of Hoagland: 
"This Court reversed that trial court's decision, stating: 
Irrespective of what the trial judge may have had in mind, the record shows that 
respondent had made none of the monthly payments ordered in the decree of 
divorce, nor had he applied to the court to be relieved from making the same. His 
failure to make the payments placed him in contempt and he was not entitled 
as a moving party to any consideration until purged of the contempt. As was 
said in the recent case of Brown v. Brown, 66 Idaho 625, 165 P.2d 886, 887: 
"In the second place, being in default, therefore in contempt, as 
was appropriately found by the trial Court, until purged of the 
contempt by payment of past-due installments, appellant has no 
right as a moving party to be heard in connection therewith or as to 
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the modification of future payments under the original decree. Sauvaneau 
v. Sauvaneau, 59 Idaho 190, at page 193,8 1 P.2d 73 1 ." 
In the Sauvaaeau v. Sauvaqeau case, supra [59 Idaho 190,81 P.2d 7321, it is 
said: 
"Briefs have now been filed and we should observe, in the outset, 
that it appears that appellant is in contempt of the district court for 
failure to comply with the order and judgment of the court, requiring him 
to pay attorney's fees and monthly support and maintenance for the wife 
and child. Under such circumstances, it is doubtful if the appellant 
would be entitled to a hearing on appeal until he either complies 
with the order or purges himself of contempt; but we are not passing 
on that question (Vollmer v. Vollmer, 43 Idaho 395, 399,400,253 P. 
622; Bedke v. Bedke, 57 Idaho 443,449,65 P.2d 1029) for the reason 
that the respondent is the one in whose favor the order was made and she 
is the one who applied to the court to set the case down for hearing on its 
merits." 
--Id. 69-70. Emphasis Added. 
Just as the Nab Court would later look at this line of cases, the Hoagland Court 
looked at these prior cases as well, in setting forth the general rule that a support 
conternnor must first pay the support arrears before being allowed to move to 
modify." -- Ryan's Brief, at pp..14-15. 
Thus, the Hoagland holding didn't arise from "nowhere." The Idaho Supreme Court had 
addressed the, issue, if only in dicta, eight years prior to the BrowrdHoagland Courts' finally 
adopted the holding in cases more or less directly on point. 
5. Failure to Pay Child Support for Years is Not in a Child's Best Interests. 
Both Belinda and the District Court fail to make any argument whatsoever regarding the 
impact of the failure to pay child support as it relates to the best interests, health and well-being 
of the unsupported child. In so doing, both miss the fundamental point of the public policy 
adopted by this Court in Brown and Hoagland. As Ryan previously demonstrated: 
It cannot be denied that there is a nexus between the payment (or non-payment) of 
support and the best interests of the children. Abandonment and non-support are 
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not only crimes in the state of Idaho, they are also grounds for the termination of 
parental rights. See Idaho Code Section 18-401 et seq., as well as Idaho Code 
Section 16-2005(a). While the non-payment of support may or may not 
(depending on the circumstances of the individual case) constitute 
"abandonment," it is clearly a factor that Idaho courts consider in making a 
determination as to whether abandonment has occurred. Further, it is the 
expressed, longstanding statutory policy in the state of Idaho that a parent has a 
duty to support hisker child(ren); see 32-1 102, 32-1201 et seq., and 32-704, 32- 
706,32-707, and 32-71 OA, as well as 7- 100 1 et seq, 7-1 20 1 et seq, and of course, 
7-610 and 7-612. The duty of a parent to support his or her child(ren) is, 
obviously, one not taken lightly by the state, given the sheer volume of statutes 
passed regarding said duty, and the resources that the state expends in order to 
ensure that children are adequately supported. The adjudicated, proven, wilful1 
failure to provide support for one's children is, by definition, proof that one has 
not acted in their best interests. - Ryan's Brief, p. 22. 
Belinda offers no counterargument whatsoever, blithely asserting "To hold that, as a 
matter of law, no consideration will be given a child's best interests simply because a child 
support debt is owed from prior years, is unsound legally and socially, and should not be the 
law." Belinda's Brief, p. 12. The irony of Belinda's statement is that it follows just two 
sentences after this one: "Every day, our trial courts have before them potentially abusive or 
neglectful parents who should be called to answer for their mistreatment of a child." Belinda's 
Brief, p. 11. This begs the question, isn't failing to pay child support for the better part of seven 
years somewhat "neglectful?" There is no question that this is a case of a parent being 
"potentially abusive or neglectful." Belinda has been found to be in contempt twice, and been 
forced to serve jail time, as a direct result of her "neglectful" failure to support her children to the 
tune of $14,118.53. 
To reiterate: 
In Hoagland and its' predecessors, the Idaho Supreme Court was concerned with 
the iniustice of allowing the contemnor to instigate the cost of legal proceedings 
on the opposing party, where the failure to pay the required support placed the 
burden of financing the litigation on the party who was owed support. This 
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"equitable" consideration is good public policy, as shown, infra, and is contrary to 
the District Court's concern about the prejudice to the non-supportive parent. 
-- Ryan's Brief, p. 24. 
In order to overturn this long-established public policy, Belinda should be required to 
demonstrate why it is in a child's best interests that a "deadbeat parent" should be allowed not 
merely to get away without supporting that child, but should also be allowed to instigate legal 
proceedings, further reducing the amount of resources available for the support of that child. As 
of this date, Belinda hasn't even addressed the issue, let alone provided any compelling argument 
in favor of allowing such a one-sided and one-dimensional view of a child's "best interests." 
Again, Ryan would point to Kornfield v. Kornfield, 134 Idaho 383, 3 P.3d 61 (Ct. App. 2000), 
wherein the Idaho Court of Appeals upheld a decision of the trial court to allow the husband to 
deduct from his income for child support purposes the amount of attorneys' fees he had to pay as 
a result of the litigiousness of his ex-wife. Ryan would argue that this case supports the notion, 
and the policy, that the Courts should take into consideration, as they have since Vollmer, the 
inequity of one parent intentionally and maliciously depleting the resources of the other parent, 
where that other parent is primarily supporting the children, particularly in the context of an 
extended history of failure to pay child support, where the non-paying party has repeatedly been 
held in contempt. 
6. Ryan's Claim for Attorney's Fees. 
Belinda asserts that Ryan "lost" the appeal at the District Court level; yet, Ryan prevailed 
on two of the three issues which were appealed, including the District Court's affirmation of the 
trial court's finding that Belinda was in contempt, and that Ryan had sole physical custody under 
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the 2001 Order - an issue well past the 42 day appeal period. As such, the District Court should 
have awarded attorneys fees to Ryan, at least in regard to those issues. 
A. Request Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-121: 
The standard for an award of attorneys fees under Idaho Code Section 12-12 1 and 
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l) is whether a party has brought or pursued an action or appeal "frivolously, 
unreasonably, and without foundation." I.R. C.P. 54(e)(l). The Idaho Supreme Court has stated 
that where a party has "failed to provide argument or authority in support of the only issues that 
are properly before" the court, then an award of attorneys fees is warranted pursuant to Idaho 
Code Section 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l). Anson v. Les Bois Race Track, 130 Idaho 303 
(1997), p. 305. Further, "A party waives an issue on appeal if either authority or argument is 
lacking, not just if both are lacking." Anson, supra, citing State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259 
(1996). Belinda's arguments are not supported by the law she cites, and many of her assertions 
of error are in direct conflict with I.R.C.P. 75, and Nab and Hoagland. Belinda has cited no 
authority addressing the fundamental issue in the case, the existence of an equitable rule of law 
which has been in existence in the State of Idaho for over 50 years. Belinda has not cited a single 
case, even from another jurisdiction, which claims that the Hoagland rule is inequitable, against 
any statute, or unconstitutional. 
Further, Belinda has presented no argument whatsoever regarding Ryan's argument that 
Belinda's failure to pay support for years was not in the best interests of the children, nor is her 
decision to impose the cost of this litigation upon him, and the parties' remaining minor child, 
when she still admittedly owes thousands of dollars in back child support. 
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Finally, Ryan agreed, at the trial court level, to allow Belinda additional visitation with 
Isaiah, and included a recommendation for increasing visitation as Belinda proved she would 
exercise the time that she was given. Belinda instead argued that unknown, unnamed third 
parties should be given the custody of Isaiah, and imbued with the authority to decide who, what, 
when, where and how Isaiah should receive visitors. She did this without any citation to any 
authority, other than a claim to joint legal custody, which the trial court carefully explained is not 
the same as joint physical custody. 
B. Request Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 1 1.1 : 
Idaho Appellate Rule 1 1.1 allows for the imposition of costs and attorneys fees upon a 
finding that an appeal or motion on appeal was filed without a "good faith argument for the 
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law," and that it was interposed for any "improper 
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of 
litigation." MacLeod v. Reed, 126 Idaho 669, 889 P.2d 103 (Ct. App. 1995). The cost of this 
litigation has, obviously, been needlessly increased to Ryan, where Belinda was clearly in 
contempt, and appealed her conviction anyway. Further, the personal nature (and falsity) of 
Belinda's personal attacks against Ryan demonstrate that she pursued her appeal as a way of 
harassing Ryan. Where Belinda has failed to address the most basic issue in this matter, Ryan's 
argument that Belinda's failure to pay support for years was in the best interests of the 
children, her appeal lacks argument and merit. 
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C. Request Pursuant to I.C. 7-610. 
Where a party has prevailed both at the trial court level and on appeal, and received an 
award of attorneys fees and that award is affirmed on appeal, that party is also entitled to an 
award of attorneys fees for the appeal. "Since we have upheld the award below under that 
statute, the Hospital is also entitled to an award of attorneys fees on appeal. Eaale Water Co.. v. 
Roundy Pole Fence Co., Inc., 134 Idaho 626,7 P.3d 1 103 (2000)." Ryan should have been 
awarded his attorneys fees and costs involved in Belinda's District Court appeal of the trial 
court's finding of contempt, and he be awarded his attorneys fees and costs, having prevailed in 
both the trial and district courts. 
Respectfully submitted thi$@ day of July, 2010. 
V counsel for Appellant 
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served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document b the method indicated below, and 
addressed to the following: 
#--"". 
Charles B. Bauer L-'.*~.s. Mail 
Bauer & French Hand Delivered 
P.O. Box 2730 Overnight Mail 
Boise, Idaho 8370 1 Facsimile 
Fax # (208) 383-0412 
JERRY M. WARD 
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